Wireless networking is becoming a common element of industrial, corporate, and home networks. Commercial wireless network systems have become reliable, while the cost of these solutions has become more affordable than equivalent wired network solutions. The security risks of wireless systems are higher than wired and have not been studied in depth. This report starts to bring together information on wireless architectures and their connection to wired networks. We detail information contained on the many different views of a wireless network system. The method of using multiple views of a system to assist in the determination of vulnerabilities comes from the Information Design Assurance Red Team (IDARTTM) Methodology of system analysis developed at Sandia National Laboratories.
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Views of Wireless Network Systems Section 1) Introduction
Wireless networking is becoming a common element of industrial, corporate, and home networks. Commercial wireless network systems have become reliable while the cost of these solutions has become more affordable th& equivalent wired network solutions. Unfortunately, the security risks of wireless systems are higher than wired and have not been studied in depth. This report is a start in bringing together information on wireless architectures and their connection to wired networks. We detail information contained on the many different views of a wireless network system. The method of using multiple views of a system to assist in the determination of vulnerabilities comes from the Information Design Assurance Red Team (IDARTTM) Methodology of system analysis. The goal of the methodology is to identify architectural vulnerabilities of a system to some specific level of adversary. Effective and sustainable security requires a complete system approach rather than the application of individual security patches. The views are used to help determine vulnerabilities that might exist within various architectural pieces of the system.
The main goal of this report is to provide guidance in performing system level security vulnerability analysis in hybrid wiredlwireless systems, i.e., communication systems that contain hard wired and h e l e s s communicationlinks, protocols, andfor nodes. We draw a strong distinction between system level vulnerabilities and point level vulnerabilities, such as the ineffectiveness of the Wireless Equivalent Protocol (WEP). Our analysis approach will help identify where security mechanisms such as fuewalls, intrusion detection devices, IPSec, IEEE 802.1x, should be integrated into the system in order to mitigate vulnerabilities. Vulnerability analysis of any information systems that utilizes a combination of wireless and wired communication technologies, such as Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, corporate networks, emergency response command centers, can benefit from the approach presented in this document. In addition, the uniqueness and complexities of modem hybrid information systems requires system level analysis to establish a meaningful understanding of the security posture of the system. The approach presented in this report differs from typical wireless security vulnerability analysis is several important ways. First, most security analyses focus on a single component, protocol, or sub-process, and give limited consideration to the interaction with other components, protocols, or sub-processes. Examples include Security in Wireless Residential Networks ' and Intercepting Mobile Communications: The Insecurity of 80Z.IIZ. Our approach utilizes a system perspective by developing several views of the system (described below). Second, efforts such as Draft: Wireless Network Security, 802.11, ~l u e t o o t h~~ and Handheld Device?, Secure and Mobile Networking4 and Defending Wireless Infrastructure Against the Challenge of DDOS Attach$ provide more of a system perspective, but as in most other cases, the emphasis is on potential solutions, rather than describing the vulnerabilities with context of a system. Third, texts Wireless Security Models, Threats, and Solutions6and Wireless Security End to End', provide reasonable levels of detail on wireless specific issues such as unique wireless threats and security solutions for particular threats, but neither outlines how to analyze a hybrid system. While solutions to security vulnerabilities are obviously the ultimate goal, without a thorough system analysis, confidence in the true effectiveness of a proposed solution is limited. Interaction between components, protocols and sub-systems must be considered to both discover system level vulnerabilities, and to evaluate proposed system level mitigation strategies.
Our presentation utilizes an example hybrid system in order to illustrate as many common wireless components as possible, within the limitations of the technologies. We will concentrate our analysis on the wireless-to-wired network areas. With the methodology used, not every component is shown in every view; only the components that might be active or visible for that view will appear. This report assumes the reader has some basic knowledge about wireless networldng and terminologies. The views presented here may contain assumptions about other infrastructure components that may or may not actually be implemented within any given real wireless-to-wired architecture. Those assumptions are identified, as they become relevant for a particular view. The views presented here are those of the physical network, the logical network, one of network functionality, a spatial representation, and a temporal view. There may be many different names for each view, but each view is unique with respect to certain analysis points. The name given to each view is not important and is only meant for reference purposes. There may be more than one visual for each view category, when necessary to show additional detail.
The remainder of the report proceeds as follows. Section 2) provides a brief overview of the IDARTTM methodology developed at Sandia National Laboratories. Section 3) describes the example network utilized for the view development and corresponding vulnerability analysis. Section 4) includes several views with explanations of the example system described in section 3. Section 5) discusses some operations of interest derived from the established views. Section 6 ) identifies some generic securitv vulnerabilities based on sections 3.4, and 5.
. . Section 7) outlines how to ldevelop mitigation strategies based on the preceding results. And finally, section 8) draws some conclusions on the overall approach.
Section 2) IDART, Methodology
The Sandia National Laboratories IDARTTM methodolow includes several elements and ....
w.
activities supporting a structured process of analysis. This brief discussion covers those aspects of the process pertinent to this analysis. The discussion is not intended to serve as dekziption ofthe complete IDARTT~ methodology (there is a multi-day class for this purpose), but as introductory material to assist the reader in understanding the upcoming analysis. As applied in this analysis, the IDARTTM methodology exhibits three principal characteristics, listed below.
1. It is a systematic approach, which supports: a. consistency of analysis; and b. repeatability of results. 2. The distillation of design information related to the system under analysis provides:
a. the creation of multiple views, which enhances the overall system understanding; and b. multiple views that direct analysis along different levels' and perspectives; and c. supplemental security design material often lacking in original system and design documentation.
' Levels, in this context might refer to different layers of the protocol stack.
=. The process utilizes a variety of experts, while:
a. enabling experts from related fields to provide useful analysis; b. integrating the analysis of multiple personnel.
Achieving a complete understanding of highly complex systems is impractical, if not impossible. However, through meaningful assumptions and simplifying representations, the IDARTTM methodology captures the principle features of the system. This integrated, system level perspective allows subsystem experts to identify and postulate the effect of subsystem vulnerabilities on the overall system. In addition, the methodology allows for continuing the process through to creation of actual exploits for the identified vulnerabilities. (This particular analysis does not include the creation of actual exploits.) Combining the insight gained from creating various views, the indicated Operations of Interest, and the knowledge of subsystem vulnerabilities enables the identification of system vulnerabilities.
The IDARTTM methodology helps create an integrated understanding of the system to support effective vulnerability analysis. This method utilizes multiple views of the system to assist in understanding process, and in the identification of critical interfaces and components. The views presented are based on an example system, described in section 3. Not all views will provide useful insight to some possible vulnerability, but multiple views are included to demonstrate the view creation aspect of the IDARTTM methodology. The next several sections provide explanations for the included views.
Note: a view within the context of the IDARTTM methodology represents aspects of the system. The views can take the form of illustrations, network diagrams, tables, flowcharts, etc. The goal is to choose a view or series of views that help provide insight to the overall system.
Section 3) Example Network Description
The example network, shown in Figure 1 , contains many different wireless and wired network features. Most current networks will not include all the features and devices depicted or implied in Figure 1 , but the eclectic illustration assists the completeness of the analysis.
Below is a listing of key wireless features found in this network.
Key Features
The wireless features discussed here are those most representative of features that are currently in use or might well be used in the future. Some features may have variations that are not depicted in this view, or any of the views that are presented in this report. The features are listed within Table 1 below, in no special order, but are numbered only for easier reference. Multiple features might exist on a single device, but shown as separate devices depending on the view. 
Physical View
The physical view depicts all the physical components of the system, and the connectivity between those components. A link is identified between components as long as there is a physical layer connection (i.e. wired or wireless), regardless of any logical controls placed upon that link. A firewall or other device that contains access-control lists (or some other method of limiting dataflow) to limit or deny access between network segments is still connected to both segments and is capable of allowing data to flow between the segments. Other views, such as the Logical or Functional, are used to capture the operation of that component based upon its functionality and not its physical connectivity. This view contains many features that may be used in wireless networks along with a description of important data paths and the functions performed on those data paths. Not all features will be used in the average implementation. However, many features are used in combination. Most, if not all, of the components that make up the wireless system will be shown in this view, even if they might be passive in nature. Figure 1 is the graphic of this view.
Data PathlFlow View
The data paths or flows represent a key view in determining vulnerabilities. An attempt was made to identify all the paths that were available, according to the Physical View shown in Figure 1 , that utilize some sort of wireless component and fixed infrastructure. Some paths are onlv of interest during s e t u~ of a network connection while others are most important after the connection is established and application data is flowing over the link. Many of the paths listed utilize the same transmission medium, but interact with different layers of the networking protocols and therefore are listed independently. Although we cannot illustrate every conceivable path, we provide a substantial number of paths here to help the reader apply this analysis approach to their unique system.
The paths of interest in this paper are listed in Table 2 below, where the paths are separated into categories. Within each category, the possible physical paths are listed, with all intermediate points. Not all paths listed will expose a system vulnerability. However, the identification of all paths is critical to ensuring completeness of the analysis. 
Mobile Device
A -Mobile WAP 1. Mobile Device D -Mobile Device C -WAP B -network device(s) - WAS . 2. Mobile Device C -WKK=.;eEork device(s) -WAS 3. Mobile Device B -WAP B -network device(~) -WAS 4. Mobile Device B -WAP A -netwprk device(s) -WAS . . .
A -Mobile WAP -WAP A -network device(~) - WAS 6. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP -satellite A -Satellite network device(s) -WAS 1. Mobile Device D -Mobile Device C -WAP B -network device(s) - DHCP 2. Mobile Device C -WAP B -network device(s) -DHCPPP . 3. Mobile Device B -WAP B -network device@ -DHCP 4. Mobile Device B -WAP A -network device(s) -DHCP 5. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP -GAP A -network device(s) - DHCP 6. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP -Satellite A -Satellite dish A - network device(s) -DHCP 1. Mobile Device D -Mobile Device C -WAP B -network device(s) - EAP - - 2. Mobile Device C -WAP B -network device@-EAP 3. Mobile Device B -WAPPB -network device(s) -EAP 4. Mobile Device B -WAP A -network device(~) -EAP - 5. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP -WAP A -network device(~) -EAP1. Mobile Device D -Mobile Device C -WAP B -network device(s) - firewall 2. Mobile Device C -WAP B -network device(s) -firewall 3. Mobile Device B -WAP B -network device(~) -firewall - - 4. Mobile Device B -WAP A -network device(s) -firewall -- 5. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP -WAP A -network device(~) - firewall -. - . 6. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP -Satellite A -Satellite dish A - network device(s) -firewall 1. Mobile Device D -Mobile Device C -WAP B -network device(s) - . . VPN server 2. Mobile Device C -WAP B -network device(s) -VPN server 3. Mobile Device B -WAP B -network devicecs) -VPN server -- 4. Mobile Device B -WAP A -network device(s) -VPN sewer 5. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP -WAP A -network device(~) - VPN server 6. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP -Satellite A -Satellite dish A - network device(s) -VPN server 1. Mobile Device D -Mobile Device C -WAP B -network device(s) - firewallNPN -wired systems 2. Mobile Device C -WAP B -network device(s) -fiewalWPN -I firewall VPN -wired network -firewall/proxies -Internet . . --. .. -. . . . - - . -. --. -- lirewall proxies 2. Mobile Device C -WAP B -network device(s) -firewall~VPN - wired network -firewalV~oxies-Internet - 3. Mobile Device B -WAP B -network device(s) -firewalWPN - , , wired network -firewalVproxies - Internet 4. Mobile Device B -WAP A -network device(~) -firewallNPN - I -- wired network -firewalVproxies Internet - -- - 5 Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP -WAP A -networXdcnce(s) - firewalWPN -wired network -firewalVproxies-Internet 6. Mobile Device A -Mobile WAP -Satellite A -Satellite dish A - 1-network device@) -firewalWPN -wired
Network View
The network view, shown in Figure 2 , focuses on network operations, and represents a cross between the logical and physical views. Components are shown with regards to the networking function they provide. For example, the WAPs become hubs in this view since they concentrate data, but the data they concentrate can be accessible to all others near that same lo~ation.~ The wireless links have been replaced with implied wires since the device is communicating with the WAP. The wireless components shown in Figure 1 to connect the wired networks together (Wireless Bridges A & B) disappear in this view and are replaced by a "hub", just as the other WAPs. This hub implies that the data travels "outside" when moving between Wired Network A and Wired Network B. 
Logical View
This view shows the logical network connections as seen by the user, and is sometimes referred to as the application-level view. Implied wires replace the wireless devices and networking equipment. Connections to the application servers are the only interesting features in this view, following data from the client device to the various servers. The wireless components shown in Figure 1 that connect parts of the wired network together (Wireless Bridges A 62 B) disappear altogether from this view, as does the separation of the two wired networks. See Figure 3 for this view.
The Logical view incorporates the functional features of the devices in the system and arrives at a logical depiction of possible connections. Functions that require coordination between multiple devices are also included. For example, to authenticate a mobile device to a WAP, the intermediate network devices must allow connection to an authentication server. Communication must be supported and allowed between the mobile device and the WAP, as well as between the WAP and the authentication server. temporal aspects are important in the analysis. For example, when a mobile wireless device connects to a wired infrastructure, the wireless link connectivity may change in a matter of seconds, as compared to the wired connectivity that is available from days to months. Thus, if a timescale of minutes is important to the functionality of the system, wireless connectivity is an important element of the system to analyze.
There are multiple time periods shown on the temporal view. The black lines indicate both physical wires and wireless links that are intended to be constant. The dashed black lines are wireless links that are intended to be intermittent in nature such that if they aren't available, no problem is to be indicated. The solid green lines are to show links that are in place at some arbitrary time "X". The solid red lines are the links that are in place at some later time, "X" + "Y". This is to show that a wireless device can move from one "hub" to another at any point in time. This is not usually a feature of most wired networks. Figure 4 shows this view. 
Spatial View
The spatial view depicts the relative physical location of components of the system. In addition, referencing the spatial view with a fixed infrastructure or location enables establishment of physical boundaries. This view is particularly important to wireless information systems because it illustrates the coverage area for wireless communication systems, where the coverage area is specified by normal or intended operations. Introducing different communication components, such as directional antennas, higher-gain transmitters/receivers, can modify this coverage area.
Multiple spatial views are included below, where each view represents a specific aspect of the overall system, but are shown separately to allow the depiction of additional details that can affect the performance of the wireless link.
The first view, the one with two stationary WAPs, shows three mobile clients at different locations and is shown by Figure 5 . Two clients do not have access to both WAPs at the same time, while one is within range of both. However, the proximity of the mobile clients would put mobile client B in a position to "see" communications to and from the other two mobile clients and their respective WAPs. 
Router
The second view, Figure 6 is the one with the mobile WAP and shows it communicating with a stationary WAP while at Location X. The second location, Y, is only in range of another mobile WAF' that has multiple wireless hops to get back to the wired network. There was no spatial view created for the wireless keyboard. That device is a short-range device that must be within some small number of feet from the workstation, depending upon the actual protocol being used between the devices. There was also no spatial view created for the Mobile Device E (PDA-type device) either.
Section 5) Operations of Interest
The views described above help establish a baseline understanding of the system. The analysis now focuses on actions or operations that occur in the system. While there many different types of actions performed over the above paths, there are particular operations that typically interest an adversary. Paths of interest to an adversary normally include paths that provide control functions or some authentication function that might be subverted. Some of the more interesting operations are listed in Table 3 below.
Section 6) Path Vulnerabilities
This section will focus on identification of vulnerabilities for the various data paths. We make use of the various views and operations of interest documented in the previous sections to determine these paths and the corresponding vulnerabilities. Data paths identified previously (see Table 2 ) may be sub-paths of longer paths. Thus, if a path is contained within a longer path, the longer path will also contain the vulnerability identified for the shorter path. The vulnerabilities in this report are defined as affecting the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of a system. If a method for exploiting the vulnerability is known, it will be cited at the point the vulnerability is identified.
All wireless client paths have, to some extent, the following generic vulnerabilities:
Confidentiality -Data capture when 1) transmission not encrypted, 2) Weak encryption or algorithm is used, e.g. Wired Equivalency Protocol (WEP).
Integrity -1) Man-in-the-middle (MITM), attacker not necessarily closer to target, 2) spoofing, attacker not necessarily closer to target, 3) attacker can become a false WAP. Availability -Denial-of-Service (DOS) by 1) frequency jamming, 2) flooding WAP with "valid" traffic. Physical -Mobile devices axe generally less protected and more accessible for physicaltype access attacks.
Specific instances of vulnerabilities are listed here. Mobile-to-Mobile attacks. These include any attacks that could be perpetrated from machine to machine in a wired network. In the wireless world, these would be difficult to trace since there is not actual wiring to follow back to the attacker. Keystroke capture for wireless keyboard is a very stealthy method to use at a distance with a directional antenna. Additionally, sending keystrokes may be accomplished for systems using wireless keyboards, when they are left unattended. Man-in-the-Middle attacks can be accomplished with a pair of directional antennas and don't require the attacker to be physically between the client and the WAP. Access to the plain-text and the cipher-text for the same packet is available for some paths. This makes breaking the key possible for stream ciphers.
The following table, Table 4 , contains a high-level identification of vulnerability categories that are identified with each path. It contains the same paths identified in Table 2 , in the left column. The right column contains the vulnerabilities associated with breaching Confidentiality (C), Integrity (I), and Availability (A) on that path. These are vulnerability categories and not specific attacks that have been seen on the Internet. The listed vulnerabilities for a path must be examined with respect to the application that is to use that path to determine whether they are applicable or not.
Path Category
Wireless client totfrom wireless client
Wireless client tolfrom WAP
Wireless client totfrom wireless application server (WAS)
Wireless client tolfrom DHCP server
Wireless client totfrom extended authentication server (EAP) Path Vulnerability C: Leakage of authentication information between these wireless systems.
I: Adversary could become relay between the systems, modifying any information that it passes. A: Depending upon the application being run by the remote system, denial to the services could be critical. The node could become isolated or the network partitioned. C: Leakage of authentication or addressing information. I: Adversary could place a WAP between the client and authorized WAP to collect or change information between the systems. They could also change important data as it passes. A: Without access to the WAP, most wireless clients will not be able to access services they need on the network. C: Information leakage, which is possibly sensitive if it contains usernames and passw&ls or other-information, such as personnel information or design specifications. I: The level of this vulnerability depends upon the importance of the information that can be modified. Modification of data that is destined as input to any program is always a bad thing.
